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The Politics of Ahmadinejad and Chavez: A Misplaced Comparison
Abstract
This piece illustrates that comparing the political and economic impact of Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad on their respective countries based solely on generalizations regarding similarities in foreign
policy discourse is an unwarranted analytical jump. To identify the essential difference between the two
administrations, the article pays attention to the different domestic politics in each country. Ahmadinejad’s
populism seems to fit best within neoliberal populism. In stark contrast, Chavista socialism can be understood as
a “heterodox” or “alternative” economic policy.
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A couple of months ago and while attending Hugo Chavez’s funeral, Mahmud Ahmadinejad 
declared that: “no doubt Chavez will return to Earth together with Jesus and the perfect (Imam 
Mahdi)” [1]. The two men, Chavez and Ahmadinejad, who shared deep mutual affection for each 
other, are now both out of politics, with Chavez having passed away and with Ahmadinejad 
having been replaced by his pragmatist successor, Hassan Rouhani. While in power, however, 
both Ahmadinejad and Chavez were often described as “populists” who were masters of 
predicting and taking advantages of the masses’ fears, concerns and hopes. “Populism” in this 
context usually indicates a political situation in which savvy political leaders exploit the masses 
through the use of charisma, demagoguery, fiery language, and “distribution of wealth” 
propaganda [2]. In terms of its economic context, populism often emerges due to widespread 
poverty and high inequality in a country – although these conditions are not in any way the 
sufficient causes of successful populism in politics.  
Here I reject the simplistic narrative that links Ahmadinejad and Chavez in favor of highlighting 
some of the crucial differences between the two former leaders.  In the process, I hope to shed 
some light on the class politics of populism as practiced in different socioeconomic and political 
contexts.  
One reason behind the distorted analogy that views Chavez and Ahmadinejad as the same 
political phenomena is their very similar foreign policy rhetoric and their vocal criticism of the 
United States. For sure, both leaders strived for achieving a (counter) hegemony and craved 
global popularity. Indeed, this type of foreign policy is not merely the result of the political 
psychology of leaders and is in fact contextualized in a broader structural transformation that 
Robert Cox identifies as “Third-World-Based-Counter-Hegemony” [3]. However, generalizing 
the similarity in the foreign policy discourses of Chavez and Ahmadinejad to the whole political 
and economic impacts they caused in their respective countries is an unwarranted analytical 
jump. 
The fact that both Chavez and Ahmadinejad have used the rhetoric of “bringing oil money into 
people’s households” [4] as a framework for mobilizing the masses should not allow us to 
conflate the worldviews of the two men.  The political genealogies of the former leaders are 
quite different. Chavez had a well-established political profile that can be labeled as “leftist” –
with the caveat that the term implies quite a wide range of social, political and economic 
perspectives. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, came to populism from the right side of the 
political spectrum in Iran’s post-Revolution politics, for whom the Soviet Union (and not the 
United States) was the “Great Satan.”  Ahmadinejad’s political and economic agenda, therefore, 
may be best characterized as a neoliberal populism, in contrast to what was going in Venezuela 
under Chavez. Indeed, Chavista socialism can be understood as a “heterodox” or “alternative” 
economic policy but Ahmadinejad’s polices and legacy cannot. While Ahmadinejad shifted 
Iranian foreign policy towards a very antagonistic discourse vis-à-vis the United States and the 
hegemonic global order, Iranian domestic economy was by and large steered towards orthodox 
neo-liberalization. This led to a peculiar type of populism in Iran that was far from Chavista 
socialism –or many other versions of Latin American populism for that matter. 
To further distinguish between these two versions of populism, let us start with the two 
assessments conducted by the Human Rights Watch on Iran and on Venezuela. These reports are 
essentially based on a mainstream perspective of the two countries in the West. But they do offer 
some significant findings that show the differences between the two. Although these differences 
are in the realm of domestic politics, rule of law and civil liberties, they indicate very different 
domestic packages of policies pursued by Ahmadinejad and Chavez.  
In Iran, the report maintains that “…[t]he government’s repression has involved a range of 
serious and intensifying human rights violations that include extra-judicial killings, torture, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and widespread infringements of Iranians’ rights to freedom of 
assembly and expression” [5]. 
 In Venezuela, on the other hand, “… [Chavez’s] first major achievement, the enactment of a 
new constitution in 1999, offered an extraordinary opportunity for the country to shore up the 
rule of law and strengthen the protection of human rights. The 1999 Constitution significantly 
expanded human rights guarantees by, among other things, granting Venezuela’s international 
rights obligations precedence over domestic law. It also created a new Supreme Court and sought 
to provide this court with the institutional independence it would need to serve as the ultimate 
guarantor of these fundamental rights” [6]. 
Once again, the different political genealogies behind Chavista Socialism, and Ahmadinejad can 
help us better understand the reasons behind the above differences. Ahmadinejad came to power 
with the blunt support of the conservative camp in Iran who has been the ruling class in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran during the past two decades. The second round run-off election in 2005 
was very telling in this regard. In that election, Ahmadinejad, as the conservative candidate and 
the new darling of the hardliners, competed against and defeated the pragmatist technocrat 
Rafsanjani, who had gotten closer to the reformist camp to cultivate their votes.  Four years later, 
Ahmadinejad again enjoyed the full support of the conservative camp along with the now more 
powerful hardliners during the infamous 2009 election. 
By contrast, in 1999, Chavez rose to power by emphasizing labor policies and democratic 
transformation by giving people a voice for their demands. Chavez came to power with the 
mobilization of the working class in Venezuela and with the promise of protectionism and an 
increase in state intervention to provide people with various socioeconomic support systems and 
access to the natural resources of the country. Except for a similar promise of access to oil 
revenues, most of other elements of Chavez’s domestic policy campaign were absent from 
Ahmadinejad’s first campaign in 2005 and certainly his second campaign in 2009. Instead, the 
thrust of Ahmadinejad’s campaign message (especially in 2009) was to fight the old political 
establishment. 
The second and related crucial difference between the two was their economic policies after they 
became elected. Chavez followed a policy of aggressive economic expansionism with a network 
of government companies, an increase in governmental spending on public assistance programs 
and the provision of more free education and free health care especially for the poor and the 
disabled. Chavez succeeded in redistributing some of the national wealth to the benefit of the 
poor, however inefficient this redistribution may or may not have been. In short, his many social 
programs used the country’s oil revenue to transform the standard of living for many poor 
people.  
In a stark contrast, Ahmadinejad pursued a series of short-sighted and ill-planned policies that 
triggered the shrinking of vital services offered by the government while at the same time 
causing a massive expansion of government’s already inefficient and slow bureaucracy. Right 
after his first election, Ahmadinejad shut down two important offices responsible for planning, 
controlling and monitoring public spending by drafting the annual national budgets. This was 
followed by a national policy of cutting most government subsidies on prices, ranging from 
gasoline to electricity, with the promise of offering cash to the poor in return. Many political 
observers viewed this infusion of large amounts of cash into the hands of the poor without regard 
for its consequences on the rate of inflation as Ahmadinejad’s way of securing his political 
power for the future and rendering the working class dependent on him. Secondly, he cut 
subsidies in part to reduce the budget deficit. As a result, the working class received less value 
for the income they had and the gap between the social classes in Iran dangerously increased 
during his administration. Along with cutting subsidies, Ahmadinejad continued the process of 
privatization in an aggressive fashion. Even worse, the process turned out to be deeply corrupt 
and colored with special treatments as many government assets and industries were transferred to 
people loyal to his administration. These assets were then used by the new owners to secure large 
loans from banks, which brought the Iranian banking system to the verge of collapse. 
Meanwhile, the industrial sector –either private or pseudo-private– has shrunk and the 
unemployment rate (for the labor forces) has increased in part due to mismanagement. The 
corruption and mismanagement got to the point that Iran’s much criticized judicial system had to 
step in, as it recently arrested a number of people and sentenced them to long jail terms on 
charges of corruption, briberies and embezzlement to calm down some of the domestic pressure.  
Those targeted ranged from journalists to labor demonstrators.  
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the total oil revenue of Iran has been around 976 billion 
dollars, of which the Ahmadinejad Administration’s share was 531 billion dollars or more than 
half in only seven years of his presidency. A considerable amount of this massive influx of oil 
revenues has been used for the import of consumer products often by pseudo-private entities with 
close ties to the government through which they could obtain import permits and credit lines. In 
fact, even some of the hardliners have begun arguing that had Ahmadinejad invested part of this 
revenue in building or revitalizing the economic infrastructure of the country, Iran would not 
have suffered to the degree it has from harsh economic sanctions. [7] 
Finally, Ahmadinejad developed a solid reputation for unconditionally supporting those people 
close to him and for providing them with considerable political and economic opportunities. It 
was only towards the end of his Presidency, and after Ahmadinejad had parted from some of his 
former hardline supporters, that controversial news emerged about the corruption of his 
Administration with leaks about his costly travels on the public budget, including above all his 
trips to New York City [8].  Despite all these allegations, Ahmadinejad was awarded with  
permission to establish his private university in Iran after his term in office –a very rare 
permission as most of Iranian higher education is public. Also, the creation of a new office, 
called the “previous president’s office” [9], for him is part of that story.   
There is little doubt that one of the main reasons Ahmadinejad allied with Chavez was to further 
similar anti-US discourse. Yet, extending the analogy beyond the foreign policy discourses of the 
two seems to be unwarranted. Eventually, Chavez’s legacy for Venezuela was Chavista 
socialism, while Ahmadinejad seemed to have left behind a crippled government, high inflation 
and unemployment rate and a series of devastating economic sanctions –a legacy that led in part 
to the defeat of conservatives in the most recent Presidential election.   
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